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NOTE
IT’S NOT A “GET OUT OF JAIL FREE” CARD: PROSECUTING
INTERNATIONAL SEX CRIMES WHEN THE VICTIM DOES NOT
TESTIFY
Christiana Johnson†
ABSTRACT
The United States court system has many safeguards in place to protect the
rights of both the victim and the defendant. But what if those safeguards fail to
keep the parties safe? In cases of international sex crime, the victim is often
unable to testify. If the court finds victims’ critical statements inadmissible due
to hearsay or Confrontation Clause concerns, the perpetrator remains “safe”
from punishment. Ironically, in many of those instances, the very policies on
which the hearsay exceptions and the Confrontation Clause were built are not
achieved. This Note analyzes how prosecutors can use current hearsay
exceptions to admit critical statements made by an unavailable witness. It also
discusses Confrontation Clause concerns at length, in order to provide
prosecutors the necessary history and policies behind the Clause to respond to
concerns presented in court. Finally, the Note proposes that the Federal courts
adopt an exception to hearsay for victims of international sex crimes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sex crimes against children rage rampant.1 United States citizens are
† Christiana Johnson, Juris Doctor Candidate, Liberty University School of Law, May
2020. Thank you Professor Tchividjian for proposing this idea to me and more importantly
fueling the fire within me to advocate for the victimized. An enormous thank you to my family
and friends, without whom I would not have made it through law school. All glory to my
Savior, Jesus Christ, who has called me to “proclaim liberty to the captives.”
1. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 1, 55–60 (2018),
https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-trafficking-in-persons-report/. The report addresses sex
(and labor) trafficking and its prosecution on a global scale. Id. at 55–60. In 2017, there were
24,138 identified victims of sex trafficking, and only 1,733 prosecuted in Africa. Id. at 55. In
that same year, between East Asia and the Pacific, there were 10,819 victims and 2,949
prosecutions. Id. at 56. In Europe, there were 12,750 victims and 2,548 prosecutions. Id. at 57.
In the Near East, there were 1,834 victims and 974 prosecutions. Id. at 58. In South and Central
Asia, there were 40,857 victims and 8,105 prosecutions. Id. at 59. In the Western Hemisphere,
which includes the United States, there were 10,011 victims and 1,571 prosecutions. Id. at 60.
Other sex crimes rage rampant as well: The World Health Organization has reported that “One
in 5 women and 1 in 13 men report having been sexually abused as a child.” Child
Maltreatment, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.who.int/news-room/factsheets/detail/child-maltreatment.
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commonly found among the perpetrators.2 While legislatures have
strategically implemented several laws to combat these crimes,3 the laws
prove futile if prosecutors do not use them. For example, the PROTECT Act
provides jurisdiction to prosecute United States citizens who commit sex
crimes against children outside the United States.4 But the Act is worthless if
not used by prosecutors to hold perpetrators accountable.
However, executing these laws may prove difficult. “Translating
legislation into meaningful action demands dedication, focus, and resources
and requires that those implementing it truly understand both the underlying
letter and the spirit of the law.”5 While perhaps preferable to prosecute the
crime in the country in which it occurred, host countries may fail to do so.6
When a United States citizen commits sexual abuse in a foreign country, and
2. Basyle Tchividjian argues that “United States citizens are sexually victimizing a large
number” of the children abused overseas. Basyle J. Tchividjian, Catching American Sex
Offenders Overseas: A Proposal for a Federal International Mandated Reporting Law, 83
UMKC L. REV. 687, 712 (2015). He notes that United States citizens’ travel to foreign countries
in recent years has grown and that “many United States citizens temporarily or permanently
reside in foreign jurisdictions.” Id. at 713 (footnotes omitted). In a 2004 article by Katherine
Breckenridge, she cited to the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission,
that estimated that “over 250,000 sex tourists visit Asia every year, with twenty-five percent
coming from the United States and thirteen percent from Australia.” Karen D. Breckenridge,
Justice Beyond Borders: A Comparison of Australian and U.S. Child-Sex Tourism Laws, 13 PAC.
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 405, 413 (internal citations omitted). See also Daniel Edelson, Note, The
Prosecution of Persons Who Sexually Exploit Children in Countries Other Than Their Own: A
Model for Amending Existing Legislation, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 483, 484–85 (2002).
3. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 1, 6 (2019),
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-Trafficking-in-Persons-Report.pdf
(“[I]n just two decades, 168 governments have implemented domestic legislation criminalizing all
forms of human trafficking whether the crime happens transnationally or nationally.”).
4. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act
of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
5. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 1, 6 (2019),
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-Trafficking-in-PersonsReport.pdf.
6. A country may not prosecute:
[I]f the conduct in question is not prosecutable under the host state’s
laws. The host state may have a stricter standard of proof for crimes such
as rape, may impose an unduly light sentence for the offense, may be
barred from prosecuting by its own statute of limitations, or may not
regard certain conduct, such as child abduction or fraud, as criminal. The
host state may fail to prosecute for reasons based on the nationality of the
parties involved, or on the cost of prosecution.
Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal
Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 41, 57 (1992)
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that country does not prosecute, the United States should step in to ensure
justice. While prosecuting a crime that occurred on foreign soil may not be
ideal due to evidentiary challenges,7 it is an important step in the
administration and assurance of justice for the victimized.
Prosecuting sex crimes within the United States poses unique challenges.
More specifically, “testimony and other evidence reveals that prosecutors
must approach these cases differently from more traditional criminal cases
since victims may be unavailable, unwilling, or in too much danger to
testify.”8 When these same crimes occur outside the United States, these, and
other logistical issues, arise. Unique challenges confront the prosecutor,
especially in regard to evidence9 and acquiring witnesses.10 This Note will
attempt to provide helpful arguments for prosecutors to use when the childvictim of an international sex crime is unable, unwilling, or unavailable to
testify.
First, this Note considers hearsay exceptions relevant to international sex
crime cases. It analyzes various cases that discuss hearsay exceptions to
determine how prosecutors may successfully enter necessary statements
from the victim into evidence. This analysis assists in determining which
current exceptions may be effective for prosecutors and whether the current
exceptions effectuate the policies behind the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Second, this Note discusses the Confrontation Clause, outlining the
evolution of relevant case law and pertinent exceptions. While the
prosecution of international sex crimes must prove effective, it must also
maintain fairness for the defendant. Similar to the analysis of hearsay
exceptions, a discussion of Confrontation Clause issues will assist in
determining which out-of-court statements may be entered into evidence
and whether current case law achieves the purposes of the Confrontation
Clause.
7. Id. at 54–55 (noting that prosecution in the state in which the crime occurred makes the
most sense, since “it ensures that the offender’s trial takes place near the scene of the crime
(thus minimizing evidentiary problems), and avoids a conflict of jurisdiction with the host
state.”).
8. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CONFRONTING COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
AND SEX TRAFFICKING OF MINORS IN THE UNITED STATES 219 (Ellen Wright Clayton et al. eds.,
2013).
9. See, e.g., Heather C. Giordanella, Status of 2423(b): Prosecuting United States Nationals
for Sexually Exploiting Children in Foreign Countries, 12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 133, 154
(1998) (“Holding a trial close to where the offense occurred enables law enforcement to collect
necessary evidence to prosecute the offender.” (citations omitted)).
10. Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal
Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 41, 73 (1992) (“Securing the attendance of a witness from
abroad, particularly one who is recalcitrant, raises difficult problems.” (citations omitted)).
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Third, the Note hypothesizes solutions for admitting victim statements if
the victims in United States v. Durham had not testified. The Note considers
hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues surrounding the case. This analysis
is meant to help apply the previous discussion in the Note to a similar set of
facts in order to demonstrate how the arguments may pan out in a real case.
Finally, this Note proposes an exception to the prohibition on hearsay. Not
only does the exception ensure that the policies behind the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Confrontation Clause are satisfied, it enables prosecutors
to hold defendants accountable for the heinous crimes they commit overseas.
The exception provides a new layer of protection for children across the globe
and accountability for perpetrators.
II. BACKGROUND
Manners are mostly associated with saying “please” and “thank you.”
When someone has bad manners, usually he or she failed to communicate
those pleasantries, open a door for another, or speak politely. The girls in
Upendo Children’s Home used the phrase “bad manners” to describe the
sexual abuse they suffered at the hands of Mr. Durham, a missionary who
was staying at Upendo.11 After more than a month of staying there, the
manager of Upendo, Ms. Wambugo, walked into one of the rooms and saw
that Durham was in bed with one of the girls.12 The girls told Wambugo that
they had “been doing bad manners” with Durham.13
After this discovery, several of the volunteers confronted Durham.14 At
first, he claimed that he did not remember, but once alone with Wambugo,
he admitted to the sexual acts.15 After returning to the group, he again said
he could not remember.16 Within a few weeks, he flew back to the United
States, but before he left, Durham consented to a recording of his statement
confessing what he had done.17 Durham also wrote down a detailed account
of how he abused the children at Upendo.18
At trial, five of the eight alleged victims testified, “including the victims
associated with each of the four convictions.”19 A medical expert testified for
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180, 1189–90 (10th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1190.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Durham, 902 F.3d at 1190.
Id.
Id. at 1191.
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the prosecution, and the court admitted Durham’s recorded and written
statements into evidence.20 The jury convicted Durham of four counts of
“traveling in foreign commerce and engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a
minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c).”21 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
convictions, along with the sentence of 480 months in prison.22
United States v. Durham demonstrates the utility of the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003 (PROTECT Act).23 The purpose of the PROTECT Act, as noted in
Durham, is to “combat the multibillion dollar international sex trafficking
market.”24 The PROTECT Act amended the statute under which Durham
was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), in 2003.25
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c): “Any United States citizen . . . who travels in
foreign commerce, or resides, either temporarily or permanently, in a foreign
country, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.”26 As
defined under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f), “illicit sexual conduct” is “a sexual act”
with a minor that violates chapter 109A if it happened in the “special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” “any commercial
sex act . . . with a person under 18 years of age,” or “production of child
pornography.”27
In Durham, under the PROTECT Act and § 2423, the Federal Government
had the authority to prosecute Durham’s crimes.28 The girls at Upendo will
20. Id.
21. Id. The jury also convicted Durham of three more counts of violating § 2423(c), which
the district court acquitted Durham of “because the Government had not shown Mr. Durham
engaged in ‘sexual conduct’ as defined by the statute . . . .” Id. at 1192.
22. Id. at 1240, 1192.
23. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
24. Durham, 902 F.3d. at 1197.
25. Id. at 1196.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2018).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f) (2018).
28. Durham, 902 F.3d. at 1192. Durham contested the constitutionality of the statute,
alleging “noncommercial illicit sexual activity abroad has no relation to foreign commerce.”
Id. However, after surveying what the lower courts had stated on the matter, the court held
that the PROTECT Act still gave Congress jurisdiction over noncommercial sex acts, such as
the ones Durham engaged in. Id. at 1216. More specifically, the court stated that when
Congress passed § 2423(c), it “had a rational basis to conclude it was regulating activity that
substantially affects foreign commerce. In particular, it could reasonably decide that foreign
travel followed by noncommercial sex with minors—in the aggregate—substantially affects
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suffer from the effects of Durham’s abuse for years to come. While a 480month sentence does not undo the abuse Durham committed, it provides
some accountability for his actions and it, hopefully, sends a message that sex
crimes are to be taken seriously, whether they occur domestically or
internationally.
Despite the United States having jurisdiction to prosecute both
commercial and noncommercial international sex crimes, there are
evidentiary and constitutional issues that arise when considering prosecuting
these crimes. In Durham, several of the victims testified at trial.29 Incredibly,
not only did five of the eight alleged victims testify, but these five included
“the victims associated with each of the four convictions.”30 Thus, in regard
to the victims’ testimony, no Confrontation Clause or hearsay issues arose.31
However, many times, when perpetrators travel overseas and commit
abuse, it may be nearly impossible to find the victim, or, if found, transport
them to the United States to testify.32 Without the victim, prosecutors may
hesitate to further investigate or prosecute the crime. If the government still
prosecutes without the victim’s presence, the prosecution must navigate both
Confrontation Clause concerns and hearsay rules in order to admit their
statements into evidence.
The PROTECT Act and 18 U.S.C. § 2423 provide prosecutors with an
avenue by which to prosecute international sex crimes. Indeed, between the
passage of the PROTECT Act and 2008, “there have been 65 convictions of

the international market for sex tourism.” Id. Thus, whether the sexual act is commercial or
noncommercial in nature, under § 2423 and the PROTECT Act, prosecutors can hold
defendants accountable for abuse they commit overseas. Id.
29. Id. at 1191.
30. Id.
31. At least in regard to the appeal, the defendant did not raise any hearsay or
Confrontation Clause issues regarding the victims’ testimony. Id. at 1192, 1217, 1222, 1225,
1230, 1233, 1236, 1239 (noting the issues on appeal included the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(c), a Brady Claim, some of the Defendant’s statements, alleged prosecutorial
misconduct, authentication of cell phone videos, medical records of victims, sentencing, and
cumulative error regarding the alleged prosecutorial misconduct and the Brady claim).
32. Giordanella, supra note 9, at 152–53 n.157 (1998) (“Since the United States would
encounter difficulty in flying child witnesses to the United States to testify at trial, the
government may depose the children or introduce tes-timony via satellite. The Confrontation
Clause, however, prohibits the use of foreign depositions unless the deposed is unavailable and
the testimony appears reliable. . . . In addition, testimony via satellite in the United States may
present a Confrontation Clause objection if the defendant is unable to question his accuser.”
(emphasis added) (referencing Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for
Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 41, 55 (1992)).
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child sex tourists.”33 Prosecuting these crimes “to the fullest extent possible”
is a key way that the Government can combat sex crimes against children.34
However, a victim’s failure to testify presents incredible difficulties for
prosecutors. While current hearsay exceptions provide some solutions for
admitting critical statements, they may not always prove sufficient. In order
to ensure the policies the legislature relied upon in promulgating the Federal
Rules of Evidence, Congress should pass a new exception for these cases. In
so doing, Confrontation Clause concerns must also be analyzed and
answered.
III. WHO SAID SO, ANYWAY?: UTILIZING CURRENT HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
WHEN THE VICTIM OF AN INTERNATIONAL SEX CRIME DOES NOT TESTIFY
Before considering a new exception to the rules of hearsay, it is important
to consider the utility of those currently in place. There are a number of ways
that current hearsay exceptions may be used to admit out-of-court
statements. The following analysis presents those exceptions that seem most
applicable to international sex crime scenarios.
A.

Federal Rule of Evidence 801: Definitions and Exclusions

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, if the statement is not being offered
for the truth of the matter asserted, it is not hearsay.35 While this hearsay rule
seems rather elementary, there are several instances in which a prosecutor
may creatively use this exception to admit a statement that would assist in
proving the defendant’s guilt. United States v. Al-Maliki provides just such
an example.36
In Al-Maliki, a jury found the defendant guilty of sexually abusing two of
his children in Syria, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(c) and (e).37 At trial, the
defendant argued that the statement of Mark Goldrup, the vice-consul at the
U.S. Embassy in Damascus, Syria, was inadmissible hearsay.38 Goldrup said
that the defendant’s wife “stated that she had been abused by [al-]Maliki.”39
The court found that the statement did not constitute inadmissible hearsay
because the government did not offer it to prove the truth of the matter
33. The Facts About Child Sex Tourism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 29, 2008), https://20012009.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/08/112090.htm.
34. Id. (specifically addressing child sex tourism).
35. FED. R. EVID. 801.
36. United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2015).
37. Id. at 789–90.
38. Id. at 789, 794.
39. Id. at 794.
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asserted, but instead “for the limited purpose of explaining why [Goldrup’s]
government[al] investigation began.”40 Since it was not offered for the truth
of the matter asserted, the wife’s statement was admissible.41 Thus,
prosecutors should always consider whether the statement is offered for some
other purpose besides proving the truth of the matter asserted. If so, then it
does not constitute hearsay in the first place and may help to prove that the
crime occurred.
Another notable hearsay exception under 801 is 801(d)(2)(E), or the coconspirator exception.42 The exception is for statements “offered against an
opposing party and . . . made by the party’s coconspirator during and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.”43 In United States v. Bianchi, the defendant
“repeatedly traveled around the world to meet and engage in sexual conduct
with young boys.”44 The court noted that the defendant had a co-conspirator
who translated and facilitated the sexual encounters between the defendant
and the young boys.45
While the court in Bianchi did not rely upon the co-conspirator exception
to hearsay, the case provides an example of when a prosecutor could use the
co-conspirator exception to prove that abuse occurred. Per Giles v.
California, “[C]ourts may make preliminary findings of this kind. For
example, where the government charges a defendant with conspiracy, the
judge is permitted to make an initial finding that the conspiracy existed so as
to determine whether a statement can be admitted under the co-conspirator
exception to the hearsay rule.”46 The defendant in Bianchi was charged with
one count of conspiracy to engage in illicit sexual conduct in foreign placeces
under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(e).47 Thus, a judge could have made an initial finding
that a conspiracy existed based on the charge, and the prosecution could have
used that to introduce statements the defendant’s co-conspirator made.
Prosecutors should keep the co-conspirator exception in mind when
issuing charges against defendants in international sex crime cases. If the
elements for conspiracy are met, the prosecutor should charge the defendant
with conspiracy and request that the court make a preliminary finding that
40. Id. at 794–95 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Martin, 897 F.2d
1368, 1371 (6th Cir. 1990)).
41. Id. at 794–95.
42. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
43. Id.
44. United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 157 (3d Cir. 2010).
45. Id.
46. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 403 (2008).
47. Bianchi, 386 Fed. App’x at 157.
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the conspiracy existed. The prosecutor could then use that finding to rely
upon the co-conspirator exception to admit the victim’s statements, or
another’s statements that would support the allegations.
B.

Federal Rule of Evidence 803: Exceptions to the Rule Against
Hearsay—Regardless of Whether the Declarant Is Available as a
Witness

Federal Rule of Evidence 803, which lists the exceptions that apply
regardless of the availability of the declarant, provides several key ways to
admit out-of-court statements. White v. Illinois and United States v. Iron Shell
provide helpful examples of how prosecutors may rely upon Federal Rule of
Evidence 803 to admit vital out-of-court statements into evidence. Both
opinions discuss the excited utterance exception and the medical treatment
exception.
In White v. Illinois, the Court found that the prosecution did not have to
first prove the availability of the victim to admit the victim’s statement, at
least in regard to the excited utterance and medical treatment and diagnosis
exceptions.48 The defendant was charged with aggravated criminal sexual
assault of a four-year-old.49 The babysitter heard the victim scream and went
to her room.50 The babysitter found S.G.—the victim—and the defendant in
S.G.’s room, and the defendant then left the house.51 S.G. then told her
babysitter what had occurred and, thirty minutes later, her mother.52 About
forty-five minutes after the scream, she told a police officer.53 Four hours after
the scream, she told medical personnel at the hospital.54
At trial, the victim did not testify, but the babysitter, mother, police officer,
emergency room nurse, and doctor testified.55 While the defense objected to
the testimony of each of the witnesses, claiming their testimony was
inadmissible hearsay, the trial court found that the statements were
48. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 348–49 (1992). The Supreme Court discussed the
“spontaneous declaration” and “medical examination” exceptions, both exceptions under the
Illinois Rules of Evidence. Id. at 348, 350 n.1, 351 n.2. The court noted that the spontaneous
declaration exception is recognized under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), otherwise known
as the excited utterance exception, and the medical treatment and diagnosis exception is
recognized under 803(4). Id. at 355 n.8.
49. Id. at 349.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. White, 502 U.S. at 350.
55. Id.

342213-Liberty_Law_14-2_Text.indd 143

5/13/20 7:35 AM

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

418

[Vol. 14:2

admissible under the Illinois hearsay exception for spontaneous
declarations.56 In regard to medical personnel, both the spontaneous
declaration exception and medical treatment exception applied.57
The Court discussed whether the prosecution was required to “produce
the declarant at trial or [whether] the trial court must find the declarant
unavailable” before the court admitted statements that fell under a hearsay
exception.58 Ultimately, the Court held that these procedures were not
“constitutionally required,” and affirmed the appellate court’s ruling that the
statements were admissible.59 Thus, the court did not have to first find that
the victim was unavailable before the statements were admissible under the
spontaneous declaration and medical examination exceptions.60
In the case of United States v. Iron Shell the Eighth Circuit was
predominantly concerned with the medical diagnosis or treatment hearsay
exception.61 The case involved the sexual assault of a nine-year-old girl, who
testified at trial, but “was unable to detail what happened after she was
assaulted by the defendant.”62 The doctor also testified at trial.63 In
determining the admissibility of the victim’s statements to the doctor, the
court discussed the history of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), known as the
medical diagnosis or treatment exception.64 According to the court, the
modern rule changed the old rule in two ways:
First, the rule adopted an expansive approach by allowing
statements concerning past symptoms and those which
related to the cause of the injury. Second, the rule abolished
the distinction between the doctor who is consulted for the
purpose of treatment and an examination for the purpose of
diagnosis only; the latter usually refers to a doctor who is
consulted only in order to testify as a witness.65
The court noted that the victim’s statements fell within the third category of
803(4), the “inception or general cause of the disease or injury” category, and
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 350–51.
Id. at 348–49.
Id. at 348–49, 358.
White, 502 U.S. at 348–49.
United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 82–85 (8th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 82.
Id. at 82–83.
Id. at 83.
Id.
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that the key issue then became whether the statements made were
“reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.”66
In determining whether the statements were reasonably pertinent, the
court discussed two key rationales behind the rule.67 First, “[i]t focuses upon
the patient and relies upon the patient’s strong motive to tell the truth
because diagnosis or treatment will depend in part upon what the patient
says. It is thought that the declarant’s motive guarantees trustworthiness
sufficiently to allow an exception to the hearsay rule.”68 Second, the court
noted Judge Weinstein’s reasoning: “‘a fact reliable enough to serve as the
basis for a diagnosis is also reliable enough to escape proscription.’ . . . [L]ife
and death decisions are made by physicians in reliance on such facts and as
such should have sufficient trustworthiness to be admissible in a court of
law.”69 From these rationales, the court established a two-part test to ensure
that the reasoning behind the exception was upheld: “[F]irst, is the
declarant’s motive consistent with the purpose of the rule; and second, is it
reasonable for the physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or
treatment.”70
The court first analyzed the victim’s motive, finding that “[t]here [was]
nothing in the content of the statements to suggest that [the victim] was
responding to the doctor’s questions for any reason other than promoting
treatment.”71 The court emphasized that the victim’s statements primarily
concerned “what happened rather than who assaulted her,” and that while
“[t]he former in most cases is pertinent to diagnosis and treatment . . . the
latter would seldom, if ever, be sufficiently related.”72 Finally, the court noted
that the age of the patient was relevant in determining the admissibility of the
statements as it “mitigates against a finding that [the victim’s] statements
were not within the traditional rationale of the rule.”73 Ultimately, every one
of the victim’s statements was admissible under the test because “they were
related to her physical condition and were consistent with a motive to
promote treatment.”74
66. Id.
67. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d. at 83–84.
68. Id. (citing Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940)).
69. Id. at 84 (quoting 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence §
803.125 (Mark S. Brodin, ed., Matthew Bender ed. 1979)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84.
74. Id.
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The court then discussed the reasonability of the physician relying on the
information, finding that the doctor’s motive was to “treat [the victim] and
to preserve any evidence that was available.”75 The court stated:
It is not dispositive that Dr. Hopkins’ examination would
have been identical to the one he performed if [the victim]
had been unable to utter a word. . . . It is enough that the
information eliminated potential physical problems from
the doctor’s examination in order to meet the test of
803(4). . . . Dr. Hopkins also testified, in response to specific
questions from the court, that most doctors would have
sought such a history and that he relied upon [the victim’s]
statements in deciding upon a course of treatment.76
Ultimately, both the victim’s and the physician’s statements were admissible
as a statement “made for . . . medical diagnosis or treatment . . . .”77
White and Iron Shell illustrate how the excited utterance exception and
medical treatment exception may be used in cases in which child sexual abuse
has occurred. The holdings of the cases should assist prosecutors in admitting
out-of-court statements because (a) they will not have to first prove
unavailability for excited utterance and medical treatment statements,78 and
(b) they will be able to admit statements to physicians “concerning past
symptoms and those which related to the cause of the injury,” including
doctors “consulted only in order to testify as a witness.”79 Prosecutors of
international sex crimes should especially consider these exceptions.80
While the specific exceptions discussed in Iron Shell and White will not
apply in every case, the court’s reasoning sheds light on how prosecutors
should argue admissibility. Prosecutors should take note of the courts’
tendency to reflect upon constitutional requirements,81 the purpose of the

75. Id.
76. Id. at 84–85 (footnote omitted).
77. FED. R. EVID. 803(4); see Iron Shell. 633 F.2d at 84–85.
78. While Federal Rule of Evidence 803 clearly states that such a finding is not mandatory,
White v. Illinois provides case law support to the rule as well as an example of its usefulness in
court. FED. R. EVID. 803; White, 502 U.S. at 348–49, 58.
79. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d. at 83; see White, 502 U.S. at 348–49, 358 (1992).
80. See discussion infra Section V.
81. White, 502 U.S. at 348–49, 358.
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rule,82 and the motive of the speaker.83 Prosecutors who integrate these
considerations into their arguments to the court will be far more persuasive.
C.

Federal Rule of Evidence 804: Exceptions to the Rule Against
Hearsay—When the Declarant Is Unavailable as a Witness

Federal Rule of Evidence 804 provides exceptions for instances when the
declarant is unavailable. In order for the hearsay exceptions under 804 to
apply, the prosecution must first establish that the declarant is unavailable.
From there, the prosecution argues the specific exceptions under 804 to
admit the statements.
Generally speaking, child victims of sexual abuse may be unavailable for
several reasons. For instance, an inability to remember and a refusal to testify
“despite a court order” are reasons that the victim could be unavailable under
804.84 Moreover, an individual who is a non-citizen of the United States may
be found unavailable because of the inability to “procure” the witness
through process.85 According to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17, “If
the witness is in a foreign country, 28 U.S.C. § 1783 governs the subpoena’s
service.”86 However, 28 U.S.C. § 1783 speaks to serving a subpoena on a
United States citizen, but does not provide process for non-citizens.87 Thus,
if a non-citizen victim does not come volitionally, prosecutors would be
unable to “procure” them, and the victim would qualify as an unavailable
witness under 804(5).88 Once the prosecution establishes that the declarant is
unavailable, the prosecution must show that one of the hearsay exceptions
under 804 applies.
Perhaps one of the most relevant hearsay exceptions for international sex
crime cases under 804 is 804(b)(6), commonly called the forfeiture
exception.89 The rule provides that a witness is considered unavailable if the
witness’s prior statement is “offered against a party that wrongfully caused—
or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a
witness, and did so intending that result.”90

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 83–84.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(e)(2).
28 U.S.C.S. § 1783 (LexisNexis 2020).
FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
Id.
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United States v. Gurrola provides an example of how the forfeiture
doctrine may be used successfully in a case involving sexual assault.91 At trial,
the victim’s statements came in through her brother.92 In Gurrola, the
defendant argued that the lower court erred in admitting the victim’s
statements under the forfeiture doctrine.93 More specifically, the defendant
argued that the Government failed to prove that the defendant in fact caused
the victim’s unavailability.94 However, the court found that the defendant
possessed the requisite intent in 804(b)(6), as evidenced in a pre-trial hearing
conducted on the admissibility of the victim’s statements.95
In that pre-trial hearing, the case agent testified that two individuals had
told him that “Gurrola ordered [the victim] murdered specifically to prevent
her from testifying.”96 Thus, the court found that because the agent’s
testimony was “highly probative of [the defendant’s] motive for having [the
victim] killed” that was “later confirmed by [a witness] at trial,” the district
court did not err in admitting the victim’s statements through her brother.97
The defendant’s direct threats against the victim were sufficient to establish
his intent to make her unavailable to testify.98
The policy behind the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, which may
apply both to hearsay and the Confrontation Clause, is equity.99 In other
words: “a man shall not profit from his wrongdoing.”100 A perpetrator may
be found to have caused the witness’s unavailability if the abuse made it
impossible for the victim to testify. Perpetrators of international sex crimes
should not benefit from their wrongdoing, nor from the fact that they
committed the crime overseas, making prosecution more challenging. The
policy underlying this hearsay exception should assist with the argument that
if a perpetrator commits a heinous crime against a victim, and that interferes
with the victim’s ability to be present for trial, their statements should be
admissible. The prosecutor should seriously consider the forfeiture exception

91. United States v. Gurrola, 898 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2018).
92. Id. at 534.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 534–35.
96. Id. at 534.
97. Gurrola, 898 F.3d at 534–35.
98. Id. at 535.
99. See Katie M. McDonough, Comment, Combating Gang-Perpetrated Witness
Intimidation with Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1283, 1301-04 (2013).
100. Id. at 1303.
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in arguing the admissibility of victims’ statements, despite potential difficulty
proving that the perpetrator intentionally caused the victim’s unavailability.
D.

Federal Rule of Evidence 807: Residual Exception

Federal Rule of Evidence 807, the residual exception,101 is a seldom used
exception to the bar against hearsay.102 However, there have been instances
where the courts have admitted statements relying on this exception. The
exception holds two basic requirements: (1) “the statement is supported by
sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness . . . .”; and (2) “it is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the
proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.”103 In determining whether
a statement is admissible under the residual exception, courts heavily rely on
the policies the Federal Rules of Evidence were written to achieve.
For example, in Doe v. Darien Board of Education, the court found that
certain statements were admissible under the residual exception.104 In Darien
Board of Education, the plaintiffs, the victim and his parents, alleged that the
victim’s paraprofessional aide sexually abused him.105 The plaintiffs offered
the victim’s parents’ statements, the victim’s psychiatrist’s statements, and a
Sexual Assault Response Team interview transcript into evidence.106 The
court discussed the residual exception in its discussion of the admissibility of
the parents’ statements and the interview transcript.107 In regards to the first
element of the residual exception, the trustworthiness of the statement, the
court noted that the United States Supreme Court listed several factors for
101. FED. R. EVID. 807.
102. See Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1979) (commenting on
the rule’s legislative history and cautioning against the over-use of this exception).
103. FED. R. EVID. 807.
104. Doe v. Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d 386, 402 (D. Conn. 2015).
105. Id. at 393.
106. Id. at 395–96.
107. Id. at 398. For the policies behind the residual exception, see In re Archdiocese of
Milwaukee, No. 11-20059-svk, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 922 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Mar. 24, 2015). In
that decision, the court stated:
A residual exception was considered necessary in order (1) [t]o provide
sufficient flexibility to permit the courts to deal with new and
unanticipated situations, (2) [t]o preserve the integrity of the specifically
enumerated exceptions, [and] (3) [t]o facilitate the basic purpose of the
Federal Rules of Evidence: truth ascertainment and fair adjudication of
controversies.
Id. at 22 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1048 (1st Cir. 1997)).
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determining “whether hearsay statements made by a child witness in child
sexual abuse cases are reliable.”108 Those factors include: “spontaneity and
consistent repetition,” “mental state of the declarant,” “use of terminology
unexpected of a child of similar age,” and “lack of motive to fabricate.”109
In the court’s analysis in Darien Board of Education, the court noted the
general consistency of the victim’s testimony, despite small variations,110 the
statements’ being made “spontaneously, without much prompting or
questioning,”111 the victim’s ability to lie,112 the victim’s prior accusations of
abuse,113 and the victim’s behavior after the alleged assault.114 Ultimately,
given these factors, the court found that the statement satisfied the first
element of 807.115
Furthermore, the court found that the statements were “unquestionably
material”116 and “would be the most probative on what happened” to the
victim.117 The court also emphasized that the parents would testify as to what
their son told them, and the jury could determine the credibility of their
statements.118 Finally, the court found that admitting the victim’s statements
would best serve the interests of justice and purpose behind the Federal Rules
of Evidence:
The propriety of requiring extremely young [or disabled]
victims of abuse to take the stand as the only method for
putting before the jury what is, in all probability, the only
first-hand account of the circumstances of abuse other than
that of the defendant is debatable. In a more relaxed
environment, the child in this case was able to provide his

108. Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d at 398 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805,
821 (1990)).
109. Id. (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 821–22).
110. Id. at 398–402.
111. Id. (citing Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d at 1080 (7th Cir. 1992)).
112. Id. at 400.
113. Id. The court noted that an allegation of sexual assault would have been “out of
character” for the victim. Id.
114. Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d at 400.
115. Id. at 400–01.
116. Id. at 401 (quoting United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 1979).
117. Id. (quoting Brookover v. Mary Hitchcock Mem’l Hosp., 893 F.2d 411, 420 (1st Cir.
1990)).
118. Id.
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version of the relevant events and yet avoid a potentially
traumatic courtroom encounter.119
Therefore, the court found that the victim’s statements would “likely be
admissible at trial under the residual exception.”120
In determining whether the residual exception will allow for the
admittance of a hearsay statement, the court will analyze the elements listed
in Federal Rule of Evidence 807.121 Perhaps the most compelling argument,
however, is how the admittance of a statement can achieve the purposes
behind the rules. According to United States v. Sposito, these purposes
include “truth ascertainment and fair adjudication of controversies.”122
Ultimately, the court in Darien Board of Education largely relied upon those
purposes in its decision.123
Even if the other, more commonly used hearsay exceptions do not allow
the statement of a victim into evidence, prosecutors may attempt to use the
residual exception. While prosecutors may hesitate to argue the admissibility
under the residual exception because of the uncertainty of its success, without
a change in the Federal Rules of Evidence, this may be the only option to
effectively prosecute certain international sex crimes.124
IV. JUSTICE FOR BOTH SIDES: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT, CRAWFORD V.
WASHINGTON, AND EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES
A.

The Confrontation Clause and Its Underlying Policies

When a victim is unable, unwilling, or unavailable to testify, a key issue
that arises is the defendant’s right to confront the witness. The Sixth
Amendment ensures the defendant’s right “to be confronted with the
witnesses against him” in criminal cases.125 Several courts have commented
on the intent behind and policies supporting the Confrontation Clause.126
Understanding courts’ concerns and reasoning regarding the Confrontation
Clause will help prosecutors know when and how to argue the admissibility
of statements from victims that do not testify.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. (quoting United States v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474, 478 (8th Cir. 1985)).
Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d at 401.
See FED. R. EVID. 807.
United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1048 (1st Cir. 1997).
Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d at 398.
See, e.g., State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 674 (N.J. 1988).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49–55 (2004) (and cases cited therein).
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In the seminal case of Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court
invalidated the Ohio v. Roberts test and held that the testimonial statements
were inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.127 In Crawford, the
defendant stabbed a man who allegedly attempted to rape his wife.128 The
defendant’s wife spoke to the police about the stabbing, and at trial, the
prosecution presented the recording to the jury.129 The defendant had no
previous opportunity to cross-examine; thus, the issue on appeal was whether
the admitted evidence violated his constitutional right to confront the
witness.130
In determining whether the statement was admissible, the Supreme Court
analyzed the test in Roberts, which held that a statement may be admissible if
it “bears ‘adequate indicia of reliability.’”131 In order to determine the validity
of the test, the Court in Crawford looked to the original intent of the Sixth
Amendment.132 After surveying the history and policies behind the
Confrontation Clause, the Court stated that the “principal evil” the
Confrontation Clause was intended to prevent was “use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused.”133 The Court stated that the
text of the Confrontation Clause references the right to confront at common
law, thus limiting its scope to those exceptions present at the time of the
nation’s inception.134
The Court in Crawford held that the test in Roberts was invalid and noted
that a reliability test was insufficient because the Confrontation Clause’s goal
“is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a
substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of
cross-examination.”135 The Court stated that the main “vice” of the Roberts
127. Id. at 61, 68.
128. Id. at 38.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66
(1980)).
132. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
133. Id. at 50.
134. Id. at 54. The exception present at the time of the nation’s inception was that the
statements were admissible only if the declarant was unavailable and there was a “prior
opportunity to cross-examine.” Id. While the Court noted that other exceptions were present
by 1791, there was little, if any, evidence to support a contention that there was an exception
to “admit testimonial statements against the accused in a criminal case.” Id. at 56 (emphasis
removed).
135. Id. at 61.
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test was that it would “admit core testimonial statements that the
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.”136
Ultimately, the Court held that the recording was inadmissible and that
the lower court erred in relying on the Roberts test.137 The statements clearly
constituted testimonial, as the declarant made them to the police.138 In order
for a court to admit testimonial statements, the court would have to find the
witness unavailable and ensure there had been a prior opportunity to crossexamine.139 Since that was not the case in Crawford, there was a clear bar
against the statements’ admissibility.140
If the Court had found that the statements were nontestimonial, they
would have been admissible.141 The Court did not go into detail about how to
determine whether or not a statement is testimonial; however, it did state
that, at a bare minimum, testimonial statements include “prior testimony at
a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police
interrogations.”142 After Crawford, the key issue became determining what
constitutes a testimonial statement.
Determining Testimonial Statements

B.

While the Court in Crawford did not provide a clear definition of
testimonial, it did state that it is “typically ‘[a] solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”143
Thus, a statement that is not offered to establish or prove some fact would
not constitute a testimonial statement. The Court in Crawford listed several
items of evidence that would constitute testimonial statements: “affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.”144 This list seems to align well
with the previous definition provided by Crawford, since those items listed
would be expected to be “made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact.”145
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 63.
Id. at 68–69.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40, 68.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
Id. (emphasis added).
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According to the Court in Crawford, statements made during police
interrogations fit squarely within the realm of testimonial statements.146 In
Davis v. Washington, the Court further dissected this seemingly clear
category.147 The Court held that because the interrogation’s “primary purpose
was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,” the
statements at issue were not testimonial.148 The Court differentiated between
the primary purpose of testimonial and nontestimonial statements made in
police interrogations: whereas testimonial statements were made to prove
“past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,”
nontestimonial statements were made to “end a threatening situation.”149
Michigan v. Bryant provides more guidance in determining the primary
purpose of an interrogation.150 In Bryant, the Supreme Court stated that, in
determining the primary purpose, one should “objectively evaluate the
circumstances in which the encounter occurs and the statements and actions
of the parties.”151 Some of the factors to consider include where the encounter
occurred (police station or where the crime occurred), when the encounter
occurred (during the emergency or after), the formality of the interrogation
(the more formal, the more like testimonial), the victim’s motives behind his
or her statements, the interrogator’s motives behind his or her statements,
and the victim’s medical condition.152
Determining whether an ongoing emergency exists depends on “the type
and scope of danger posed to the victim, the police, and the public.”153 The
Court emphasized that the standard for determining the primary purpose is
objective, or “the purpose that reasonable participants would have had, as
ascertained from the individuals’ statements and actions and circumstances
in which the encounter occurred.”154 Bryant also stated that “the primary
purpose of the interrogation will be most accurately ascertained by looking
to the contents of both the questions and the answers.”155 While the Court
noted that while an ongoing emergency occurring is not dispositive,156 it is
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 68.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006).
Id.
Id. at 822, 832.
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 359 (2011).
Id.
Id. at 360, 364–66, 368.
Id. at 370–71.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 367–68.
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 366.
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“among the most important circumstances informing the ‘primary purpose’
of an interrogation.”157
Another part of determining whether a statement is testimonial is the
defendant’s conduct. In Giles v. California, the Court discussed the common
law forfeiture doctrine by wrongdoing.158 This doctrine permits admission of
statements of “a witness who was ‘detained’ or ‘kept away’ by the ‘means or
procurement’ of the defendant.”159 The majority held that “[t]he terms used
to define the scope of the forfeiture rule suggest that the exception applied
only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness
from testifying.”160 In other words, the defendant had to cause the witness’s
unavailability with the purpose of “prevent[ing] the person from
testifying.”161 The Court vacated and remanded the case to determine the
defendant’s intent.162
Thomas D. Lyon contributed to an amicus brief in support of the
respondent in Giles.163 In an article written by Lyon and Julia A. Dente, they
observe that “[a] majority of the Court expressed the view that repeated acts
of domestic violence against the declarant should suffice to prove that her
murder was motivated by a desire to control the declarant and render her
unavailable.”164 As Lyon and Dente argue, “The Giles opinion provides an
opportunity to apply the forfeiture doctrine to the special challenges facing
the prosecution in child-witness cases.”165 More specifically, they argue in
their article that “forfeiture should apply if the defendant exploited a child’s
vulnerabilities such that he could reasonably anticipate that the child would
be unavailable to testify.”166 While mere commentary on the case, perhaps
prosecutors could adopt and apply this reasoning to certain international sex
crime cases, where it would be reasonably foreseeable that due to the
defendant’s abuse of the child, the child would be unavailable to testify.
Collectively, these cases help frame an analysis for determining whether a
statement is testimonial. By using the factors outlined in Michigan v. Bryant,
157. Id. at 361.
158. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 359.
161. Id. at 361.
162. Id. at 377.
163. Thomas D. Lyon & Julia A. Dente, Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause, 102
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1181, 1181 (2012).
164. Id. at 1184 (citing Giles, 554 U.S. at 377).
165. Id. at 1184–85.
166. Id. at 1185.
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one will be able to determine what the primary purpose is behind a
statement.167 Ultimately, if the primary purpose is to help with an “on-going
emergency,” then the statement will not constitute a testimonial statement.168
Moreover, under the forfeiture exception, if defendants act to cause the
victim’s unavailability, they forfeit their right to confront. Thus, prosecutors
addressing Confrontation Clause issues must first address whether the
statement is in fact testimonial, and if so, whether or not the doctrine of
forfeiture applies.
C.

How Ohio v. Clark Changed the Confrontation Clause Analysis

The Court in Ohio v. Clark focused on the first step of analysis: Whether a
statement constitutes testimonial.169 More specifically, the Court in Clark
addressed the issue: “[W]hether statements to persons other than law
enforcement officers are subject to the Confrontation Clause.”170 The victim,
a three-year-old, was unavailable because of her age.171 The teacher to whom
the three-year-old made statements to testified in his stead, and despite the
defendant’s objections, the Court held that the statements were not
testimonial and thus did not violate the Confrontation Clause because
“neither the child nor his teachers had the primary purpose of assisting in
Clark’s prosecution.”172
In determining the primary purpose of the statements, the Court noted
that the statements were made “in the context of an ongoing emergency” and
the teachers’ primary concern was to ensure the child’s safety.173 The Court
also pointed out that the conversation between the victim and his teachers
were “informal and spontaneous,” as the teachers asked him about the
injuries “immediately upon discovering them” in the lunchroom and
classroom.174 Thus, the Court used some of the factors outlined in Michigan
v. Bryant, such as the formality of the conversation, where the conversation
occurred, when the conversation occurred, and the interrogator’s motives

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Bryant, 562 U.S. at 360, 364–68, 371.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2177 (2015).
Id. at 2181.
Id. at 2177–78.
Id. at 2177.
Id. at 2176.
Id. at 2181.
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behind their statements.175 Moreover, the Court mentioned the victim’s
medical condition, the marks of abuse, in its analysis.176
The Court in Clark noted that it was “extremely unlikely that a 3-year-old
child in L.P.’s position would intend his statements to be a substitute for trial
testimony,” but rather, “a young child in these circumstances would simply
want the abuse to end, would want to protect other victims, or would have
no discernible purpose at all.”177 The Court held: “Statements by very young
children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.”178 The Court
also stated: “Statements made to someone who is not principally charged
with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less
likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.”179
Finally, the Court stated that it was “irrelevant that the teachers’ questions
and their duty to report the matter had the natural tendency to result in [the
defendant’s] prosecution.”180 Thus, the Court in Clark focused on the
primary purpose of the statements when the declarant made them.181 The
primary purpose did not change simply because prosecutors offered them
into evidence later.182 Clark’s holding proves instrumental for prosecutors of
international sex crimes because it applies the Bryant factors to an instance
of child sex abuse, while clarifying that the ultimate use of the statement does
not alter its primary purpose.

175. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2182.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. The defendant also argued that since the teachers were mandated reporters, the
court should find that their statements were testimonial. at 2182–83. However, the Court
found that “the teachers’ pressing concern was to protect [the victim] and remove him from
harm’s way” and that “they undoubtedly would have acted with the same purpose” regardless
of whether they had been mandated to report by state-law. Id. at 2183. The court noted that
“mandatory reporting statutes alone cannot convert a conversation between a concerned
teacher and her student into a law enforcement mission aimed primarily at gathering evidence
for a prosecution.” Id.
181. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2183.
182. Id.
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V. BUT WHAT IF THEY WEREN’T THERE?: APPLICATION OF HEARSAY AND
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE PRECEDENT TO A SITUATION WHERE THE
VICTIM DOES NOT TESTIFY
In United States v. Durham, the victims were able to testify.183 However, in
hypothesizing that they were not, the case provides a helpful example to
analyze hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues in an international sex
crime case. The below analysis considers what the author believes are relevant
hearsay exceptions and notable Confrontation Clause arguments to an
instance of international sex abuse perpetrated against a minor.
The victims’ statements to Wambugo likely would have been admissible
at trial, even if the victims chose not to testify, or were unavailable.184 After
Wambugo walked into the girls’ bedroom and saw Durham lying on a bed
with one of the girls, Durham left and Wambugo immediately spoke with the
girls.185 This conversation, where the girls told Wambugo they had been
“doing bad manners” with Durham, would most likely have been admissible
under the “present sense impression” exception. A present sense impression
is “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while
or immediately after the declarant perceived it.”186 The girls made the
statements immediately after they perceived Durham’s actions. The “excited
utterance” exception could also apply since the abuse had happened recently
and the girls were still “under the stress of excitement that it caused.”187
The utility of these exceptions is limited, especially in instances in which
the abuse has been occurring over a substantial length of time. In regard to
the present sense impression, the defense may argue that any statement that
refers to abuse that did not occur while or immediately after it was perceived
is inadmissible under the present sense impression exception. Moreover, in
terms of the excited utterance exception, prosecutors must prepare
themselves for the argument that because a sufficient amount of time has
passed, the declarant cannot claim they are still under the stress of the
183. United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180, 1191 (10th Cir. 2018).
184. First of all, regarding Federal Rule of Evidence 801, the prosecution would offer the
statements that the girls made directly after the abuse for the truth of the matter asserted. FED.
R. EVID. 801. More specifically, the prosecutor would want the statement “doing bad manners”
to be entered for the truth, since the issue at trial was whether or not there was abuse. Durham,
902 F.3d at 1190. However, this first step is always important to consider, because if the
statement is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, it does not constitute hearsay and
is admissible. FED. R. EVID. 801.
185. Id.
186. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
187. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
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excitement the incident caused. Prosecutors should look to evidence relating
to the effect of abuse on victims, which could potentially support an
argument that even though the referenced abuse occurred a while ago the
victim was still under the “stress of excitement that it caused” when he or she
made the statement.188
Other hearsay exceptions could come into play in this hypothetical. For
instance, the medical treatment exception could apply. Indeed, in Durham, a
doctor testified as to the victims’ physical state.189 The girls were examined
six days after Wambugo discovered the abuse.190 However, it is unclear from
the case what exactly occurred on the date Wambugo found Durham laying
with one of the girls. The acts he confessed to, namely, molesting and raping
the girls, occurred on several occasions.191 While the doctor in Durham did
not share any of the statements of the victims, this exception could prove very
helpful in international sex crime cases in which the victim does share
information with the doctor. Of course, as articulated in Iron Shell, the court
will examine the motives of the victim and the doctor to determine whether
to allow the doctor to share these statements.192 However, prosecutors should
utilize this exception if possible. Even if a medical exam has not been done,
188. Id.; see, e.g., Susanne Babbel, Trauma: Childhood Sexual Abuse, PSYCHOL. TODAY
(Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/somaticpsychology/201303/trauma-childhood-sexual-abuse (“With childhood sexual abuse, victims
are often too young to know how to express what is happening and seek out help. When not
properly treated, this can result in a lifetime of PTSD, depression, and anxiety.”); see also
Melissa Hamilton, The Reliability of Assault Victims’ Immediate Accounts: Evidence from
Trauma Studies, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 269, 277 (2015). Hamilton explains:
Courts have accepted excited utterances delivered quite some time after
a trauma. In one case, the court admitted as an excited utterance the
victim’s statements made to a neighbor two hours after the final assault,
as the beatings were repeated overnight and the victim was crying and
hysterical at the time of the utterance. In another case, the victim’s story
asserted ten hours after her sexual assault was admitted as the victim’s
unusual behavior between the assault and the statement indicated a
continued state of stress. A variation has arisen though it remains
controversial; it is nicknamed the “re-excited” utterance exemption and
applies when the declarant makes a statement upon being reminded of the
earlier startling event, such as from watching a movie or reading a news
article with related themes.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
189. Durham, 902 F.3d at 1219.
190. Id. at 1191.
191. Id. at 1190–91.
192. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d. 77, 83–84 (8th Cir. 1980).
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the prosecutor should consider having a doctor examine the victim (if
possible). After Iron Shell, even if the doctor is examining the witness for the
purposes of testifying at trial, they may still fall under the exception to the bar
against hearsay.193
Federal Rule of Evidence 804 may also prove helpful in an international
sex crime case. Perhaps most significant of the exceptions under 804 is the
exception for former testimony.194 If a prosecutor is unable to convince a
child to testify in court, they may be able to hold a deposition, or other
hearing specified in the rule, and present that at trial. In the case of Durham,
if the victims were unavailable, the prosecutor could have arranged for
depositions of the girls, or, if only a few could make the trip, retain
depositions of the others.
While typically not often relied upon, the residual exception has unique
applicability for child sex abuse cases. In Doe v. Darien Board of Education,
allowing children to share what happened to them in a more “relaxed
environment,” thus avoiding a “potentially traumatic courtroom encounter,”
was a compelling reason to hold that allowing the victim’s statements into
evidence without them testifying best served the interests of justice.195 Of
course, prosecutors must consider other elements, including whether the
statement is trustworthy, whether it is “offered as evidence of a material fact,”
and whether it is “more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable
efforts.”196 The prosecutor should not have much trouble proving the
materiality and probativeness of the statement, in most instances, as the
victim’s testimony is often the key element of evidence in the case.197
The largest hurdle for the admissibility of a statement under the residual
statement, then, seems to be the statement’s trustworthiness.198 This analysis
will differ in each case and will involve a variety of factors, including
consistency and spontaneity.199 The prosecutor must undergo a fact-intensive
inquiry, which may prove difficult, but, given the residual exception’s success
193. Id. at 84.
194. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). Note, however, that the Confrontation Clause will still be
implicated.
195. Doe v. Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d 386, 401 (D. Conn. 2015) (quoting United
States v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474, 478 (8th Cir. 1985)).
196. Id. at 398 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 807).
197. State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 672–73 (N.J. 1988).
198. Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d at 398 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 807).
199. Id.
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in Darien Board of Education, the prosecutor should at least consider making
the argument.200
In regard to Confrontation Clause concerns, the prosecutor must first
determine whether the statement is testimonial. In the Durham hypothetical,
the prosecutor could have made a strong argument that the declarant did not
make the statement for prosecution, but to preserve the safety of the young
girls at Upendo Children’s Home. The court would have considered the
factors outlined in Michigan v. Bryant and applied in Ohio v. Clark.201 First,
an on-going emergency concerning child abuse existed, as in Clark.202
Wambugo found Durham in the girls’ room and lying on one of their beds.203
The conversation in which the girls confessed that “bad manners” had
occurred happened directly after this discovery.204 Similar to the teacher’s
primary purpose of safety in Clark, in Durham, Wambugo needed to discover
whether the girls staying in the Children’s Home were safe.205 Finally, the
conversation was “informal and spontaneous,” as in Clark, as it occurred in
the girls’ room in the Children’s Home and immediately after Wambugo saw
Durham on one of the girls’ beds.206 Thus, regarding the girls’ statements,
admitting them at trial, even without the girls taking the stand, should not
have violated the Confrontation Clause.207
If, for some reason, the statements were determined to be testimonial, the
prosecutor should consider the forfeiture exception. As Lyon and Dente
propose: “forfeiture should apply if the defendant exploited a child’s
vulnerabilities such that he could reasonably anticipate that the child would
be unavailable to testify.”208 While the success of this argument is uncertain,
the Supreme Court’s commentary on domestic violence and the forfeiture
doctrine in Giles provides some insight that in the future, arguing the
200. Id. at 401.
201. For the list of factors, see Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358–68 (2011), as applied
in Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2177, 2181 (2015).
202. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.
203. United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2018).
204. Id.
205. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181; Durham, 902 F.3d at 1190.
206. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181; Durham, 902 F.3d at 1190.
207. While this article focuses on the statements of the victim, the statements of Durham,
including the statements that were recorded and written down, would likely have been
admissible under the opposing part statement exception. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). Since
Durham was present at trial, the Confrontation Clause would be satisfied. United States v.
Durham, 902 F.3d 1180, 1191 (10th Cir. 2018); U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
208. Thomas D. Lyon & Julia A. Dente, Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause, 102
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1181, 1185 (2012).

342213-Liberty_Law_14-2_Text.indd 161

5/13/20 7:35 AM

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

436

[Vol. 14:2

forfeiture exception in an international sex crime case involving a child may
prove beneficial.209
Ultimately, simply because a victim does not testify does not hand the
defendant a “Get Out of Jail Free” card. The current Confrontation Clause
case law provides avenues for prosecutors to offer statements into evidence
without violating the defendant’s Constitutional rights. By looking at the
history and purpose behind the defendant’s Constitutional rights protected
by the Sixth Amendment, prosecutors can understand how to effectively
argue the admissibility of statements, while respecting the defendant’s
Constitutional rights.
Every case poses distinct challenges, and in some cases, the victim may
make no statement whatsoever. However, the analysis above demonstrates
that prosecutors should not veer away from cases in which the victim is
unable to testify. Rather, they should consider every avenue available to admit
evidence in order to prosecute these heinous crimes. However, there are sure
to be instances in which the victim does not testify and the hearsay
exceptions, other than perhaps the residual exception, do not apply. For those
instances, the legislature should consider creating a new hearsay exception
specifically for cases involving international sex crimes perpetrated against
children.
VI. GETTING CREATIVE: A NEW HEARSAY EXCEPTION
A.

The Tender Years Exception

If the purpose behind the hearsay rules is to achieve justice and truth, as
has been claimed,210 then prosecutors should use the exceptions to further
those goals. When the hearsay exceptions, including the residual exception,
prove insufficient to admit critical statements, the legislature should consider
another means to ensure that justice and truth prevail.
In State v. D.R., the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted one such
hearsay exception.211 The victim in the case was the two-and-one-half-yearold granddaughter of the defendant.212 The New Jersey Division of Youth and
Family Services questioned the victim and recorded her responses, which the
jury heard at trial.213 While the trial court found that the victim was
unavailable to testify, a clinical psychologist, who had interviewed the victim
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 1184 (citing Giles, 554 U.S. at 377).
United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1048 (1st Cir. 1997).
State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 682–83 app. A (N.J. 1988).
Id. at 668.
Id. at 669.
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three times, testified.214 He stated that the sexual assault caused the victim’s
post-traumatic stress disorder.215 Moreover, the psychologist testified that the
victim expressed anxiety and fear as she used dolls to act out a sexual
assault.216
The defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault,
and endangering the welfare of a child.217 The appellate court found that the
psychologist’s expert testimony was “sufficient, even without the victim’s
incriminatory statements, to constitute independent corroborative proof
adequate to sustain defendant’s conviction.”218 However, the court found that
the statements the victim made to the psychologist were hearsay and not
admissible under any recognized hearsay exception.219 In recognition of the
limitation this posed, the appellate court “acknowledged the need for an
exception that would allow into evidence, under certain conditions,
testimony of out-of-court statements made by a young child relating acts of
sexual abuse.”220
The court noted that “[c]ourts, legislatures, and commentators that have
focused on the problems of proof in child sex abuse prosecutions appear to
agree that testimony by the victim is often the indispensable element of the
prosecution’s case.”221 Reasons for this recognition include the fact that
oftentimes the perpetrator is someone the victim or the family knows and
trusts. Usually, there are no witnesses, and “[f]requently, there is no visible
physical evidence that acts of sexual molestation have occurred.”222 Thus,
“[a]bsent a confession, the victim’s account of the sexual abuse may be the
best and sometimes the only evidence that a sexual assault has taken place.”223
Moreover, the court recognized that in-court testimony of child victims may
be less reliable than out-of-court statements because of “the stress of the
courtroom experience, the presence of the defendant, and the prosecutor’s

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 670–71.
State v. D.R., 537 A.2d at 671.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 672 (citing State v. R.W., 514 A.2d 1287, 1287–88 (N.J. 1986).
Id.
State v. D.R., 537 A.2d at 672.
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need to resort to leading questions.”224 The court also noted that the passage
of time may impede the child’s memory and since many perpetrators are
trusted family or friends, “the victim may be urged or coerced to recant.”225
The court referenced a study conducted by the American Bar
Association’s National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and
Protection, noting the study’s recommendations support the admissibility of
child victims’ out-of-court statements of sexual abuse:
[W]here it does not qualify under an existing hearsay
exception, as long as: (1) the child testifies; or (2) in the event
the child does not testify, there is other corroborative
evidence of the abuse. In support of its proposal, the
Recommendations rely on the general trustworthiness of
children’s complaints concerning sexual abuse, the pressing
need for such evidence, inadequacy of existing hearsay
exceptions to permit admission of such statements, and the
tendency of courts to invoke tortured interpretations of the
“excited utterance” exception in order to sustain
admissibility of a child’s out-of-court statement.226
In the ABA study, the commission noted that in the states of Kansas and
Washington, “legislation has been pro-posed or enacted creating a special
exception specifically for the admission of children’s statements of sexual
abuse.”227 Indeed, Washington was the first state to adopt a statute allowing
these statements,228 and other states modeled their statutes after

224. Id. at 673. Victor I. Vieth has commented on this difficult experience and advocated
for having individuals present to support the victim. Victor I. Vieth, Keeping Faith: The
Potential Role of a Chaplain to Address the Spiritual Needs of Maltreated Children and Advise
Child Abuse Multi-Disciplinary Teams, 14 LIBERTY UNIV. L. REV. 351, 364–65 (2020).
Specifically, in cases of child abuse in the church, Vieth comments that having a theologian or
chaplain present could be of immense help to the victim in navigating the process. Id.
225. State v. D.R., 537 A.2d at 672.
226. Id. at 673–74 (citations omitted) (quoting NAT’L LEGAL RES. CTR. FOR CHILD
ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION ET AL., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL
INTERVENTION IN INTRAFAMILY CHILD ABUSE CASES 34–36 (J. Bulkley ed. 1982),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/87385NCJRS.pdf.).
227. NAT’L LEGAL RES. CTR. FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION ET AL.,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION IN INTRAFAMILY CHILD ABUSE CAS
ES 35 (J. Bulkley ed. 1982), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/87385NCJRS.pdf.
[hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS]).
228. State v. D.R., 537 A.2d at 674.
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Washington’s.229 Even in circumstances without a legislative exception, the
court noted how other courts had admitted similar statements under the
residual hearsay exception.230
Based on this analysis, the court found that such a hearsay exception was
“necessary and appropriate.”231 The court reasoned that the exception would
“enable the judicial system to deal more sensibly and effectively with the
difficult problems of proof inherent in child sex abuse prosecutions.”232 The
adopted hearsay exception reads:
A statement by a child under the age of 12 relating to a
sexual offense under the Code of Criminal Justice
committed on, with, or against that child is admissible in a
criminal proceeding brought against a defendant for the
commission of such offense if (a) the proponent of the
statement makes known to the adverse party his intention to
offer the statement and the particulars of the statement at
such time as to provide him with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it; (b) the court finds, in a hearing conducted
pursuant to Rule 8(1), that on the basis of the time, content,
and circumstances of the statement there is a probability that
the statement is trustworthy; and (c) either (i) the child
testifies at the proceeding, or (ii) the child is unavailable as a
witness and there is offered admissible evidence
corroborating the act of sexual abuse; provided that no child
whose statement is to be offered in evidence pursuant to this
rule shall be disqualified to be a witness in such proceeding
by virtue of the requirements of paragraph (b) of Rule 17.233
The exception only applied to those under the age of twelve234 and only
applied to criminal cases. The court’s reference to Rule 8(1) would translate
229. Id. (noting Florida, Indiana, Minnesota, South Dakota, Utah, Colorado, and Georgia
as examples modeling their hearsay exceptions on Washington’s statute).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 675.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 683; see also R.S. v. Knighton, 592 A.2d 1157, 1163–64 (N.J. 1991). The author
of this Note cound not find a direct comparison between N.J. Evid. R. 17(b) and the Federal
Rules of Evidence. If the federal courts adopted this exception, the qualifications for the
witness would be determined by Article VI of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
234. State v. D.R., 537 A.2d at 683. In contrast, Washington’s statute applies to children
under ten, but also includes an exception for individuals under 16 years old who make a
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to Federal Rule of Evidence 104, Preliminary Questions.235 The exception
itself provides parameters for when these statements may be admissible. As
outlined below, the court considered both the policies behind the hearsay
exceptions as well as the Constitutional concerns behind the Confrontation
Clause in adopting the Tender Years Exception.
B.

The Tender Years Exception and Hearsay Policies

Essentially, the Tender Years Exception is a glorified residual exception
that applies to child victims of sexual abuse. Just as the residual exception
does, it requires notice and that the statement have a probability of
trustworthiness.236 Given the nature of cases to which the Tender Years
Exception applies, where typically the victim’s statements are the key pieces
of evidence in the case, the probative value of the statement should not prove
difficult to establish.237 Moreover, the Tender Years Exception’s requirement
of a “probability” of trustworthiness echoes the residual exception’s
requirement of “sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.”238
Currently, the statute reads that the court must find that “on the basis of
the time, content, and circumstances of the statement there is a probability
that the statement is trustworthy . . . .”239 As with other hearsay exceptions,
the closer that the statement is made to the occurrence of abuse, the more
reliable it is. While the statement may not be close in time enough to
constitute a present sense impression or an excited utterance, if the statement
is made relatively close to the abuse, and the other factors are indicative of
reliability, then the court could find the statement trustworthy.
In terms of content, the court in State v. D.R. claimed that “[y]oung
children, having no sexual orientation, do not necessarily regard a sexual
encounter as shocking or unpleasant, and frequently relate such incidents to

statement “describing any of the following acts or attempted acts performed with or on the
child: Trafficking under RCW 9A.40.100; commercial sexual abuse of a minor under RCW
9.68A.100; promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor under RCW 9.68A.101; or
promoting travel for commercial sexual abuse of a minor under RCW 9.68A.102 . . . .” WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (LexisNexis 2019).
235. See N.J. R. EVID. 104 cmt. (commenting that “[t]he subject matter covered by
paragraph (a) of Fed. R. Evid. 104 is substantially the same as that covered by N.J. Evid. R.
8(1).”).
236. FED. R. EVID. 807.
237. State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 672–73 (N.J. 1988).
238. Compare State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 682–83 app. A (N.J. 1988), with FED. R. EVID.
807.
239. State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 683 (N.J. 1988).
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a parent or relative in a matter-of-fact manner.”240 The actual words that the
children use could also support a finding of trustworthiness. For instance, in
Durham, the children’s use of the words “bad manners,” rather than a specific
description of a sex act, lends to the reliability of their statement as their
choice of words shows that they were simply trying to describe what had
occurred, which lends to the statement’s trustworthiness.241
The circumstances of the statement also lend to determining its reliability,
as circumstances can indicate the speaker’s motive for making the statement.
As discussed above, in Durham the circumstances made it clear that Ms.
Wambugo’s motive was to protect the girls.242 Moreover, the circumstances
of the statement—Ms. Wambugo walking in on Durham lying with the girls,
Ms. Wambugo asking the girls what had occurred, and the girls responding
immediately—indicate that the motive of the speakers was simply to answer
the questions of Ms. Wambugo.243 Their choice of words (“bad manners”)
also indicates that they assumed some of the fault.244 These circumstances
indicate that the motive of the speakers was not for future prosecution, but
to simply respond to questions of Ms. Wambugo. These facts support the
statement’s trustworthiness.
Not all situations are as clear as the case of Durham, however, and it will
not always prove easy to determine the motive of the speaker and listener.
The Tender Years Exception must provide more than a glorified residual
exception if it is going to help prosecutors try these cases. While the residual
exception provides an option to prosecutors, it has proven less than helpful
because it is too broad. In order for the Tender Years Exception to prove
effective, it must have stricter requirements beyond mandating the court to
consider the content, time, and circumstances of the statement. The court in
Doe v. Darien Board of Education used multiple factors to determine the
trustworthiness of the statement under the residual exception.245 Adding
these factors to the Tender Years Exception will assist courts in their
determination of whether or not a statement is trustworthy. As the Tender
Years Exception is a type of specialized residual exception, the application of
the factors to this exception makes pragmatic and logical sense.

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 673.
United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2018).
See discussion supra Section V.
Durham, 902 F.3d at 1190.
Id.
Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d at 398–402.
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The Tender Years Exception and Confrontation Clause Concerns

Adopting the Tender Years Exception poses significant Confrontation
Clause concerns, and rightfully so. Advocacy for one individual’s access to
justice should not inhibit another’s access. With that in mind, and as noted
above, courts will look to the primary purpose of a statement to determine
whether it is testimonial. If the statements are not testimonial then the
statements do not implicate the Confrontation Clause.
The New Jersey legislature drafted the Tender Years Exception before the
Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington.246 After Crawford,
mere reliability was not sufficient to admit out-of-court statements without
the defendant being able to confront.247 However, even with this alteration in
case law, Ohio v. Clark provides an example in which a court may still admit
statements by a victim because they are not testimonial.248 Courts with similar
exceptions to New Jersey’s have responded in various ways, and
demonstrated that the exception may still be adopted and used, as long as the
statement is not testimonial.249 Moreover, if the forfeiture exception applies,
the court may admit the statement without violating the Confrontation
Clause.250
While the change in case law regarding the Confrontation Clause affects
the application of the Tender Years Exception, the exception still provides a
valuable tool in allowing child victim’s statements into evidence. If the
statement does not constitute testimonial, or fits under the forfeiture
exception, than the exception could apply. Because the Confrontation Clause
would have the ability to bar the utility of the exception in certain cases,
prosecutors should first and foremost address Confrontation Clause
concerns before addressing the applicability of the Tender Years Exception.

246. The court decided State v. D.R. in 1988, but the Supreme Court did not issue its
opinion in Crawford v. Washington until 2004. State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667 (1988); Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
247. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60, 67–69 (2004).
248. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2177 (2015).
249. See, e.g., Herrera-Vega v. State, 888 So. 2d 66, 68–69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). In
Herrera-Vega, a statute similar to the Tender Years Exception was involved. Id. at 67; FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (LexisNexis 2019). The Supreme Court of Florida had relied on Ohio
v. Roberts, rather than Crawford v. Washington, in its holding that the Florida statute satisfied
Confrontation Clause requirements. Id. at 68. However, because the statements were not
testimonial, Crawford did “not entitle [the defendant] to any relief.” Id. at 68–69.
250. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008).
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Expanding the Tender Years Exception to International Sex Crimes

The key reason behind adopting a hearsay exception for child victims of
abuse applies to victims of international sex crimes. Even if physical evidence
exists, it may be extremely difficult to obtain. Thus, similar to the court’s
reasoning in State v. D.R., “[a]bsent a confession, the victim’s account of the
sexual abuse may be the best and sometimes the only evidence that a sexual
assault has taken place.”251
Congress would have to make changes to the Tender Years Exception in
order to effectively promote justice for all child victims of international sex
crimes. For instance, Congress would broaden the scope of applicability to
crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 2423. Moreover, the age requirement should be
increased to include all minors. Currently, the exception applies to children
under twelve.252 Notably, Washington’s comparable statute has a provision
for children under sixteen.253 While some may posit that older children’s
statements are less reliable than younger children’s statements, the
exception’s requirement for corroborating evidence helps protect against
unreliable statements.254
As explained above, the exception would include a list of factors in order
to provide parameters for the court in determining the reliability of the
statement. One of the factors would be the relationship between the declarant
and the listener. When the listener has a responsibility for the child’s safety
and wellbeing, similar rationales underlying the medical treatment would
support the admission of the statement. Statements under the medical
treatment exception are excepted from the hearsay ban because of the
assumption that medical professionsals are merely trying to gain information
to ultimately treat and protect the child.255 Individuals who are in charge of a
child’s wellbeing, such as teachers, counselors, supervisors, and caregivers,
typically have similar motives in asking children questions.256 Of course, this
is only one additional factor to consider in light of the others listed.

251. State v. D.R., 537 A.2d at 672.
252. Id. at 683 app. A.
253. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (LexisNexis 2019).
254. State v. D.R., 537 A.2d at 683 app. A.
255. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84 (noting that the doctor’s motive was to “treat [the victim]
and to preserve any evidence that was available.”).
256. For example, the teacher’s motive in Ohio v. Clark was to ensure the child’s safety.
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2183 (2015). Similarly, the supervisor of the home in Durham
simply wanted to discover what had occurred and protect the girls. United States v. Durham,
902 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2018); see discussion supra Section V.
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With these edits, and a few other minor ones, the exception would read as
follows:
A statement by a child under the age of 18 relating to a
sexual offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2423 committed on, with,
or against that child is admissible in a criminal proceeding
brought against a defendant for the commission of such
offense if the following three requirements are met. First, the
proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse
party his intention to offer the statement and the particulars
of the statement at such time as to provide him with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it. Second, the court finds, in
a hearing conducted pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
104, that on the basis of the time, content, and circumstances
of the statement there is a probability that the statement is
trustworthy. Third, either (a) the child testifies at the
proceeding, or (b) the child is unavailable as a witness under
Federal Rule of Evidence 804, the statement is nontestimonial [or the forfeiture exception applies], and there is
offered admissible evidence corroborating the act of sexual
abuse. This exception is based on the contingency that no
child whose statement is to be offered in evidence pursuant
to this rule shall be disqualified to be a witness in such
proceeding by virtue of the requirements of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
In determining the trustworthiness of the statement, the
court shall consider the following factors: the spontaneity of
the statement, the consistency of the statement(s), the
mental state of the declarant, the use of terminology
unexpected of a child of similar age, the declarant’s ability to
lie, the declarant’s prior accusations of abuse, the declarant’s
behavior after the alleged assault, whether or not the
declarant had a motive to fabricate, and the declarant’s
relationship to the listener. The statement has greater indicia
of reliability when it is made to an individual who has a
responsibility for the child’s safety and wellbeing, such as a
medical professional, counselor, teacher, supervisor, or
caregiver, rather than a family member or peer.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the hurdles of prosecuting international sex crimes seem daunting,
they should not cause prosecutors to hesitate to the point where they fail to

342213-Liberty_Law_14-2_Text.indd 170

5/13/20 7:35 AM

2020]

IT’S NOT A “GET OUT OF JAIL FREE” CARD

445

prosecute the crime at all. As this Note has demonstrated, current hearsay
exceptions and Confrontation Clause case law provide various avenues
through which prosecutors can admit vital statements made by victims.
However, they may prove insufficient to prosecute international sex crimes
effectively. When current hearsay exceptions run into a dead end, the
legislature should consider a new avenue by which to promote the goals of
justice and truth the exceptions were founded upon.
By adopting a new hearsay exception based on the New Jersey Tender
Years Exception, the legislature would ensure the implementation of the
policies behind the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Constitution. But the
adoption of this hearsay exception would do more than that. It would send a
message to perpetrators that leaving the borders of the United States does not
hand them a “Get Out of Jail Free” card.
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